It has long been clear that the international order functions on the shoulders of a few enthusiasts who understand the importance of the state’s transmission and work diligently to preserve and improve it. Most of their names will never be heard. They are passersby on the street, people sitting in front of or behind you on public transport, young men leaning against the fence of a café, and women you encounter in elevators, at work, or in the building. They are everywhere, characterized by their inconspicuousness, invisibility, and the fact that you will never hear them claim credit for anything. Oh, but how deserving they are.
However, they are not the subject of this text. They aren’t the subject of any text. Nor would it suit them. Otherwise, they wouldn’t dive into the deep blue where the essence of the state is set in motion. These are heroes of the caliber of Stanislav Petrov, who prevented a potential nuclear war by his act. A small detour he made on the path allowed the system to continue functioning. Above such individuals are those who are far more extroverted yet simultaneously prepared to bear the consequences if their position demands it. This is precisely the definition of a fixer—someone who goes and cleans up the debris left behind by politics. To be a fixer, one must find peace in chaos, order in disorder, and live only in the intervals between escapades. These stuntmen of the state are ready to be stigmatized and stand as the first line of defense for something that only a select few will understand, on the front lines defending the state.
Their roles are often translated from real life to the silver screen. With a touch of creative flair, characters such as Michael Clayton, Ray Donovan, Elizabeth Sloane, and many others have been brought to life. The life of a fixer is depicted as glamorous and desirable. Watching these films, many likely imagine themselves entering exclusive places, speaking with attractive men and women, harboring a mysterious allure that makes them irresistibly compelling. Yet, only a rare few possess the spark, readiness, and ultimate courage to face potentially fatal outcomes.
The aforementioned characters, whose names are also the titles of their films, carried the burden of their work behind that initial layer of luxury, a burden that cannot be compared to the reality of political fixers. Being a fixer in politics means risking everything daily, with real possibilities of ending up in prison or even facing complete ruin. States are unforgiving and rarely pardon their adversaries, and ultimately, all fixers are expendable if the price demands it.
It is encouraging that the world still functions, albeit with difficulty. There are fixers, though they are fewer and fewer. And the few that remain seem not to be training their successors, or perhaps the successors are simply well-hidden. What kind of people are they? Hard, steely, determined. Some might confuse them with late bloomers, but they are, in fact, individuals ready to serve a calling, to serve the state, and to leave behind for future generations what was entrusted to them. It does not matter what position they hold; their sole mission is to fix.
Whatever the reason, one must acknowledge the widespread absence of these individuals. In the past, every state could, at certain times, boast of their presence. They emerged in times of hardship when they were needed, and they had been through so much.
One of the best in this masterful craft was Deng Xiaoping. Without his calm and wise navigation, it’s uncertain how China would have succeeded in entering the global race and becoming the power it is today. If there’s any doubt about Deng being a fixer, one only needs to recall what fixers are. From the very beginning, he was involved in the functioning of the People’s Republic of China, but the moment that would have deterred and alienated many from the state seemed to serve as an even stronger bond for Deng. During the Cultural Revolution, he was demonized and ousted from the elite and Mao’s inner circle. This persecution lasted about a decade, during which Mao’s entire opposition, which was quite ideologically diverse, was eliminated. The chosen successor, Liu Shaoqi, one of Deng’s allies, passed away, and Lin Biao perished in a suspicious plane crash. Deng was fortunate to remain alive, but this period of his life was filled with suffering.
In addition to being constantly persecuted by the regime and continuously demonized, Deng’s son was brutally tortured by the Red Guards and thrown from a window. The official version claims he jumped, but this doesn’t change the fact that both Deng and his family endured immense suffering during this time. Eventually, Deng had to set aside his ideals and send two letters to Mao, admitting he had learned much from the incident with General Biao, apologizing for his views, and expressing his readiness to seek redemption by continuing his work for the party if allowed.
All of this was observed from the sidelines by another, much wiser fixer Zhou Enlai, about whom it was noted in a Foreign Affairs article that he allowed Mao to become Mao, understood the moment and was patient. The article might be accurate, but Enlai realized that it was impossible to contend with Mao’s nearly divine charisma. Furthermore, Mao was simply too powerful to be opposed. Aligning with dissenters and reformists would not have brought much benefit to either Enlai or the proponents of change. Mao Zedong was indeed a figure consumed by his own delusions, which he sought to enforce through the force of his own aura. Understanding this, Zhou Enlai awaited the right moment to initiate reforms. Knowing Mao’s sympathies towards Deng Xiaoping, Enlai began his maneuvering as soon as Mao mentioned the possibility of rehabilitating cadres. Among them was Xiaoping, whom Enlai approached with utmost caution. Deng’s rehabilitation was completed to Mao’s great satisfaction, as Mao tactically distanced himself from Enlai just enough to keep Zedong content while maintaining his alliance with Enlai. At that moment, however, Enlai was exposed to attacks from those who sought to weaken his position, as he was considered the successor to Zedong after his death.
History’s cynical twist led to Zhou’s death before Mao’s, but this could not prevent the reformist forces led by Deng Xiaoping. The ranks were consolidated, and after Mao’s death, the issue with the “Gang of Four” was quickly resolved with their imprisonment, allowing China to begin its restoration after decades of impulsive and nearly fatal governance. Of course, Deng Xiaoping, after all he had endured, was neither an anti-state figure nor a revolutionary but continued to build a stronger China. Had Bata Stojković been alive, he would surely have remarked, “He really fixed it, hats off to him.” Looking at the years that followed, other states within the system might agree with the esteemed actor. Deng Xiaoping made the necessary corrections to prepare China for a new era. While the brutal crackdown at Tiananmen remains a dark stain, it was also Deng’s message. He never turned against the state and the system but did advance it significantly.
Of course, he is not the only one. Throughout history, almost without exception, fixers have emerged to stabilize states and systems, ensuring that processes continue to run smoothly. Like skilled mechanics, they have fine-tuned and lubricated the gears to prevent the world’s time from deviating from its real course.
In a world notoriously divided, fixers have always been the glue that holds things together. They were not exclusive to China; they existed equally in America, Russia, France, Germany… and even some Serbian diplomats have been recognized as system custodians, with many working to improve Serbia.
Among the greatest in the world was Henry Kissinger, who understood the modus operandi of the system down to the minutest details. As such, he was among the last to leave clear instructions on how to preserve the system, as well as a serious historical perspective on its genesis. Thus, this master can be paraphrased in the question: “Whom to call today if the system needs fixing?” The answer would not be at all simple.
Many, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, believed in the limitless nature of their authority, although the true fixers—those who gently dismantled the Cold War brick by brick—left very clear instructions on how to safeguard the system. Among them was James Baker, who, at the head of the master team, managed to avoid Thucydides’ Trap and prevented a declining state from making a move that could have been catastrophic for the system. Would we be experiencing the current situation if NATO had halted its eastward expansion, a move that Baker either implicitly or explicitly suggested? More concretely, would such upheavals in the order have occurred if NATO had stopped at Ukraine’s western border? Fixers have faltered, and this is why there is so much work for them now. The hopes of those who relied on enduring stability and given promises have been betrayed, along with the understanding from some quarters.
It seems that the rules no longer exist, while the game remains the same, with the stakes growing ever higher. On the horizon, there are only a few who are willing to adapt the rules to the times and introduce VAR into international relations; most want to create an entirely new game. Thus, it is not surprising that respect among players, including those who consider themselves fixers, is diminishing. The aforementioned Henry Kissinger knew how to show respect to the Russian grandmaster Andrei Gromyko. He acknowledged that Gromyko upheld honor in negotiations, avoided surprises, and never placed the Americans in an extremely humiliating position. Even when he had to change his positions by order, it was evident that he was not entirely comfortable with it. A fundamental contrast to the present day stands on the other side. It is as if negotiations do not exist unless the other side publicly assumes an unacceptable position. Is there room for correction or agreement? It is difficult, sometimes even impossible.
Kissinger also noted that Gromyko was not treated with the respect he deserved from Gorbachev, despite being a long-serving Foreign Minister who participated in Gorbachev’s rise. If we accept all the liberal narratives about the last President of the USSR as true, Gromyko’s faith in him becomes evident. Therefore, it can be said that, after all, Gromyko understood the system and sought to repair and adapt it to the times, as true fixers do.
Today’s dramatic shortage of such figures can be found in the same place. Moshe Levin recorded Egon Bar’s disappointment with Gromyko when Bar noted that the distinguished Russian left very little in his memoirs, despite having extensive knowledge of international connections and the influence of great personalities. However, Bar’s criticism reveals what characterizes all fixers: “As a devoted servant of his state, he believed that he should limit himself to sober and concise representation of the most essential matters.” There should be no confusion here; there is nothing wrong with Gromyko’s actions. He was a public servant, a man of the state, and remained so. But the mistake lies in the apparent lack of effort invested in creating his successor.
This is a common and generalized mistake among all global fixers. Either they did not attempt it, or they paid little attention to it. Despite America’s excessive egotism and the abuse of its dominant position, the knowledge of fixers should have been transferred to at least a few vetted individuals who, as their successors, could continue to patch every crack and, if necessary, renovate certain parts. In the modern world, very few people can boast of having mentored the greatest individuals who moved mountains. This serves as a final alarm that today’s few fixers urgently need to start training their successors in larger numbers to prevent the order from collapsing again. This time, the consequences could be fatal.
Finally, perhaps the most significant aspect of any master of the international system is honor and respect for the ultimate positions of others. This role is not new and extends far beyond Kissinger, Gromyko, and Xiaoping. Fixers have been historical figures such as Richelieu, Metternich, and even Talleyrand, Gorchakov, and Castlereagh, as well as William of Orange, and perhaps someone like Jakob Fugger… Fixers have also included Churchill, De Gaulle, and Roosevelt, among many others whose names will never be known because they worked from behind the scenes. What they all had in common was the desire to find a way for the world to continue functioning. Reflecting on Gromyko, Kissinger also mentioned that when he thinks of him, he remembers a great and accommodating professional, deeply committed to creating peace between Americans and Soviets. Fixers do precisely this: they find ways to overcome differences and limitations, thereby creating periods of peace. Like all other masters, without fixers in politics, the system is left to its own devices and fickle fortune, where collapse might be narrowly avoided.