The series “Friends” is a timeless sitcom that, despite serious and honorable competitors, is in some ways the most popular in its genre. What sets it apart from other genre rivals, such as “The Office,” is that the characters create events through their close relationships, as opposed to the overall competition that drives the plot of the other show. Joey, Monica, Ross, Rachel, Chandler, and Phoebe are protagonists whose shared life is sometimes functional, sometimes not, but it is always connected. Through all difficulties, individual success was achieved, and in failure, comfort was always found in others. In contrast, the characterless protagonists of “The Office” are like chameleons ready to change their colors driven by pure careerism. With their concept of cooperation, either out of love or utility, “Friends” managed to etch their names into the Parthenon of eternal television characters.
Similarly, the current world order was formed and operates comparably. The focal point in observing this is certainly World War II. It marks the beginning of the rise of U.S. power, reaching its peak with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Realistically, the United States still leads today, as evidenced by the absence of a new world war that could have reshuffled the global order. The impression is that no power in history has moved as flexibly, involving itself in the affairs of states around the world as the U.S. does, skillfully avoiding Thucydides’ trap. Ultimately, until recently, there was no true competitor to challenge a world shaped according to American will, especially after their Soviet opponent was finally defeated.
It is possible to say that the modern world order was built between two poles – Hobbes’ principle of omnia contra omnes and Kant’s cooperation among states towards achieving perpetual peace. Simultaneously, it was a playing field for great powers, and the United States skillfully exploited every free space where they could cooperate with potential partners, never forgetting Hobbes’ view that man is a wolf to man.
This is best illustrated by the recent past, quite uncharacteristic of friends, where Barack Obama’s administration tapped Angela Merkel’s phone. The paradigm that best describes these relationships is certainly “frenemy.” From then until today, this has become even more pronounced, particularly during Donald Trump’s tenure, when ties with Germany transformed from friendship to silent animosity. A realistic answer to the question posed in Charles Kupchan’s book “How Enemies Become Friends” would be: due to utility or subjective interpretation of national interest fulfillment. Hence, the behavior of all states aspiring to a patriarchal position resembles more the emotionally conditioned fabric of the series “Friends” than the manipulative-egoistic stance of the characters in “The Office.”
Observing the NATO alliance, as a post-Yalta institution for increasing U.S. influence, the contrast between Donald Trump’s and Joseph Biden’s approaches stands out today. What underlies their policies, however, is an understanding of how America’s interest will be achieved, just as at the beginning. As a direct successor to the late 20th-century tradition, Joseph Biden pursues a transactional policy, while Donald Trump advocates transformation, believing that America’s well-being will be achieved by turning inward. Despite their disagreements, a common point is that both have their list of desirable friends. For Biden, these are long-time American allies, while Trump is more oriented towards representatives of hardline conservatism worldwide.
All of this can be subject to terminological and substantive disputes, but the model by which things operate is quite clear. To build a certain policy and achieve interests, friends, or at least allies, are necessary. Carl Schmitt’s sharp dichotomy on the friend-enemy axis is more than useful in such moments. Regardless of how much his personality is disputed, it is not realistic to deny the perspective his theory provides. Thus, if there is a hegemonic tendency in a state, and it can be said that this is the case with every state, it is necessary to identify those with similar interests or those who can be persuaded to align with one’s position (friends) and others who see their future on the opposite side (enemies).
A better example of building a dominant position in the order is the Yalta Conference compared to the end of the Cold War, for the simple reason that it required careful and thorough reasoning due to the presence of a fierce competitor ready to exploit any mistake. Viewing the world through the lens of stability, the warning about the dangers America would face after the dissolution of the Soviet Union turns out to be almost accurate. While it existed, the USSR was a corrective factor constantly reminding the United States that they were merely an “ordinary” superpower, much like the troubadour who repeatedly told Marcus Aurelius that he was just a man.
Stan Lee famously established in his Spider-Man comic that great power comes with great responsibility. The popularity of the United States began to decline after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as they did not fully understand what the writer meant. When there was no one left to oppose them, some unilateral decisions followed, casting a dark shadow not only over the United States but also over its allies. The intoxication of victory nearly turned the ideals of the victor into those of a destitute drunkard and certainly contributed to other competitors recovering and embarking on a new endeavor to change the system.
The historical label has carried over to the present, but not every line has taken hold properly, partly due to mistakes by Russia and China as primary challengers, and partly because the United States pulled the handbrake. Objectively, it must be acknowledged that Russia was certainly never close to shaking the world throne, while China, from this point of view, was a bit premature with its offensive. The fundamental thing that American competitors will need to understand in the future is that an order cannot be formed without willing or unwilling friends.
How did America do it? At the end of World War II, it had a significantly better position than the Soviet Union because its losses were incomparable to those of the Soviets. Additionally, America profited during the war and gained new territories in exchange with the British, while the war was not fought on its continent. The Soviets, worn out by the war, were a magnificent opponent considering the disadvantage they had at the start. Nevertheless, the Americans demonstrated more acumen, style, and talent for winning friends than the Soviets. Or for making friends, however, one looks at it.
Although both sides started very similarly in their recruitment of remnants from the Nazi regime, with the USSR having its “Operation Osoaviakhim” and the U.S. the much more well-known “Operation Paperclip,” it is here that the drastic differences began. The Soviets kept the captured scientists in a subordinate position, not allowing them to see their families, whereas the Americans cleaned up their biographies and turned them into respected members of the community. During the 1950s and 1960s, it would turn out that the American strategy in the fight against the Soviet Union was significantly more successful. Besides the fires they set, from the informal adoption of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Americans managed to spread the anti-communist element throughout communist countries and encourage numerous revolutions worldwide.
Reacting to these pyromaniac acts, the USSR failed to adequately anticipate its response, losing the hard-earned reputation of being Europe’s liberator in the fires burning in their sphere of influence. While tanks were entering the capitals of Eastern Europe or a wall was being erected in Berlin, the Americans skillfully paid for the love of their new friends.
Since the Marshall Plan, the United States managed to create the image of a benefactor providing funds for the reconstruction of Europe after the war, although the truth was that they profited the most during and after the war. They skillfully concealed the fact that by rebuilding the post-war European economy, they were enabling even greater opportunities for their own growth and development. Simply put, it was impossible to collect debts from nothing; it was necessary first to generate capital from which a portion could later be taken. The reason the Soviets could not approach it this way might lie in the fact that they too had to work on rebuilding their country and recovering from enormous human losses, but this certainly does not justify the fact that they needed to use less force and repression on their “friends.”
Perhaps the American victory in the Cold War was partly aided by the allure of capitalist ideas. After all, most of the states formed from the remnants of the USSR accepted that ideology. If not declaratively, at least the population absorbed the values of Western capitalism and consumerism. Additionally, this does not mean that the core ideas of the Soviet Union were bad, but rather that they were eroded by the passage of time. The USSR was akin to a hairy man in an age of metrosexuality.
It remains indisputable that both sides used their friends, either by force or seduction, depending on the approach, primarily for their own interests. The only difference was the “collateral damage” their allies suffered. American allies were harmed by profit, while Soviet satellites benefited from regression, and vice versa.
If we take this paradigm of friends, it can be said that America has forgotten the needs of its allies, which is why it is now facing less popularity and stronger voices advocating for European strategic autonomy. However, the free fall has been halted, and now the superpower aims to reestablish the primordial order in the international system.
Whoever wants to succeed must pay attention to friendships, and it must be acknowledged that among the USA, Russia, and China, the former is once again in a better position. Why? Partly because of the position it entered the 21st century from, and partly due to the mistakes of its competitors. Russia chronically refuses to form friendships, believing in its own autarchy. The few allies it has cannot be said to be chosen by it; rather, it was directed toward them. In terms of influence in Europe, it appears to be associating more with students who often skip class than with those who attend regularly. Furthermore, Russia’s popularity is inextricably linked to the personality of Vladimir Putin, who is now in his eighth decade of life. Thus, if they want to achieve a dominant position, from which they are increasingly distant, they will have to address the challenges posed by Putin’s aging and transfer some of his charisma to the state. Additionally, they need to determine which friends are necessary for that endeavor. It is unlikely that Hungary and Slovakia can compensate for the loss of Czech allies and the absolute distancing of Poland.
The current state suggests that in the coming decades, essential allies will surely be those from the European continent. Africa is in an artificial chaos that, even if resolved now, would take several decades to develop into a significant pivot. On the other hand, friendships in Asia could tip the balance, but only when certain questions are answered. Are Russia and China ready to share the position of hegemon? Is either Russia or China prepared to remain in the shadow of the other? How will they respond to the monsoons from India?
It should be noted that America is slowly anchoring itself in the Pacific, which will lead to an even stronger development of its friends, starting with those initial nuclear submarines in Australia.
The Chinese, unlike the Russians, have shown a lot of style, sensitivity, and skill in their assessments, but also errors in self-perception. The Belt and Road Initiative was premature, and now there are no traces of the initial enthusiasm that existed at its inception. Due to this and several other events, China seems to have slightly deviated from its course and started to wander at a time when deviation is not advisable. All the positive progress made can slip into an abyss at any moment because Chinese actions at times appear more impulsive than well-thought-out. One such instance was the visit of Ursula von der Leyen to Beijing, where the EU leader was treated with considerable cynicism. This is not something China needs, especially when Macron, wherever necessary, acknowledges the authority of Ursula von der Leyen, as witnessed by the Chinese president when his visit to Paris was enriched by an “uninvited” guest.
However, it is telling that China has somewhat withdrawn itself once again. Under the pressure of its internal financial state, crises, and the collapse of some economic pillars, as well as demographic challenges, China seems more focused on quietly resolving its problems and rejuvenating itself before making another push toward a leadership position in the international system. Unlike the first time when some Mediterranean countries were considered initial partners, the Chinese have now identified Macron as the pillar of their European policy, which is wise, but it should be noted that the French president will not be eligible for re-election after this term. However, it may be expected that he will continue his career in one of the EU institutions.
Certainly, China will have to devise a response to its Asian challenges and answer similar questions as Russia.
After everything, it becomes apparent that America has survived more due to others’ negligence, impulsiveness, and inadequate understanding of how the system functions and the importance of true friends, rather than its own prudence. Now, however, it is richer in experience, which it has effectively leveraged. Another step where it surpasses its competitors is one in which the identity of America’s leader is less crucial. Whether it’s Trump or Biden, tomorrow it could be Newsom or Haley, or anyone else; the name of the president is irrelevant. They will always understand the importance of alliances and, in line with national interests, choose their friends. If its challengers fail to learn this lesson, it’s likely that with the departure of current charismatic and strong leaders like Putin and Xi, China and Russia will further lag behind America.
Author: Aleksandar Stanković