Author: Ambassador Dr. Dusko Lopandic
“The collective personality of a nation, as well as the individual, is born and dies in time”
Raymond Aaron
The area of the Balkans (or Southeast Europe) [1] in the period from the beginning of the 19th century until today has undergone at least six major changes in the regional interstate system. [2] These transformations are characterized by shorter and mostly violent earthquakes, which were followed by longer phases of stabilization. The radical reshaping of the Balkans in the cycles of destabilization and stabilization was most often caused by wars, uprisings or internal conflicts of a larger or smaller scale, the aim of which was to create, affirm or expand nation-states in the areas that were initially in this period consisted of two empires (Ottoman and Austrian empires). [3] The causes of the Balkan earthquakes had the most common social and autonomous roots and were significantly influenced by wider European events. [4]
Instead of two empires from the beginning of the 19th century, six predominantly smaller states were formed in the Balkans after World War I. Today, a hundred years later, that number has almost doubled. The increase in the number of states in the Balkans and frequent border changes have complicated and made less functional and difficult to maintain the entire Balkan interstate system in the long run, which has always been subject to strong and contradictory external influence (great powers) – either in terms of stabilization or in the opposite direction. The process of disintegration of states was called “balkanization” in the 19th century. The word later became a general term for the process of fragmenting larger political communities into smaller ones. [5]
The issue of “freedom of the people”, new borders, social rights and relations between the national majority and the minority were the key factors that influenced the character of Balkan relations in the 19th and 20th centuries. Given that the creation of nation-states based on ethnic and linguistic kinship of the population facilitates the rule on the principle of support of the majority of citizens of one country, we can talk about the long-term influence of national factor and nationalism as a mobilizing and modernizing social factor, [6] and on the gradual rise of the democratic spirit, on the other hand – as processes that had their ups and downs in the Balkans. Under the influence of the principle of people’s self-determination in the 19th and 20th centuries, political processes in the Balkans imposed the need to determine and confirm the legitimacy of government in a new way, which in turn encouraged the gradual modernization of nation states in line with their European models ( in terms of the principles of constitutionality, progress of the rule of law etc.). [7] “Nationalism, as Andrej Mitrović wrote, has been a historical fact since its inception, which acts on gathering and connecting, and at the same time on dividing human groups, political phenomena and historical movements, therefore, modern and contemporary feelings of affiliation and diversity were partly created on its basis. ”[8] The twentieth century was also a period of bitter conflicts in Europe on ideological grounds – especially between “intolerant ideologies” – communism and nazism, as well as between communism and democratic systems, which in that period encouraged antagonisms and destabilization of relations in the Balkans as Europe’s periphery. [9] State and border changes also opened the question of interethnic (international) relations, i.e. relations between (ethnic or other) majorities and minorities. The issue of the position of minorities, and thus of individual rights, represented a constant theme and challenge to the Balkan system, from the Habsburg and Ottoman times until today.
The stability of Balkan relations as a kind of periphery of Europe (one can also talk about the Balkan “subsystem” within the European interstate system, such as the Balkan geographical peninsula of Europe) always depended on three interdependent factors (which can be seen as three levels of stability): (1) the internal stability of each of the Balkan states, (2) regional stability, i.e. from interstate and interethnic relations in the Balkans, as well as (3) the wider international, and primarily European order. Long-term stability implied the internal self-sustainability of each of the units of the international system – the state. [10]
In the first decades of the 21st century, we are witnessing new phases in stabilizing the region, after the end of the Cold War and the last period of balkanization, which began with the breakup of federal Yugoslavia (1991/1993) and continued with the breakup of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro (2006). All Balkan countries have already become members, are negotiating as candidates or are potential candidates for EU membership. It is similar when it comes to the relationship with NATO (with the exception of Serbia, which did not request NATO membership). This trend is further strengthened by the practice of regional multilateralism (regional cooperation), which also has a certain, albeit weaker, stabilizing effect in relation to the processes of integration into European integration with supranational elements. [11]
In the following, we will present the basic stages of the two-century evolution of interstate relations in the Balkans. In doing so, we will not deal with the analysis of internal social evolution, i.e. political developments within individual Balkan countries, which in this analysis we view primarily as subjects of international relations and major participants in the regional system.
From Vienna to the Congress of Berlin – between the principles of legality of old regimes and new ideas of “free nation”
Two centuries old empires – Austria and the Ottoman Empire – divided the Balkan political and geographical space almost completely at the beginning of the 19th century. [12] The first Serbian uprising began only 15 years after the French bourgeois revolution based on the slogan of “freedom, equality and brotherhood” of the entire French nation. The Napoleonic Wars spread the spirit of the bourgeois revolution throughout Europe and even to the Balkans (Illyrian provinces). The beginning of the 19th century also indicated a period of dramatic international and internal changes in the Balkans, in then still predominantly feudal empires. The uprisings in Serbia (1804, 1815) and then in Greece (1820) as well as the Turkish-Russian wars (1806-1812, 1828-1829) brought into question (inside and out) the Ottoman Empire, and especially its attitude towards the Christian people who lived under the rule of the sultan. The Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) and the later “Spring of the People” (revolution of 1848) posed a huge challenge to the Austrian Empire, which at times jeopardized the survival of the thousand-year-old Habsburg monarchy. Nevertheless, the conflict between the principles of legality of the old regimes and the demand for change (revolution), collective and individual freedom and justice ended in a temporary victory of conservative principles. The Berlin Congress (1814) and what followed (such as the forming of the Holy Alliance between the three Empires) delayed the formal opening of national issues as well as the “Eastern” question for about half a century. [13] The unreformed empires in the Balkans gradually and partially withdrew under external or internal pressure. The first forms of nation-states appeared. From 1830, Serbia became an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire (Wallachia and Moldavia became that even earlier). [14] In the same year, the great powers recognized Greek independence. In the Austrian Empire, the national question (primarily the position of the Hungarians, but then other people as well) became a constant political topic until the Austro-Hungarian settlement (1867), but also after it. The Paris Peace (1856), which ended the Crimean War, confirmed Turkey’s borders. At the same time, the sovereignty of the sultan in some of his areas was legally and essentially relativized, because European guarantees for the autonomy of Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia were given by an international agreement for the first time.
The Order of the Berlin Congress: Between National Independence and the Politics of Imperialism (1878-1918)
After the Bosnian Uprising (1875), the Serbian-Montenegrian-Turkish Wars (1876 and 1877) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877), the Berlin Congress of 1878, organized by the great European powers, announced a new Balkan order and a partial solution to the Eastern question. [15] In the former territory of the Ottoman Empire, along with Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were recognized as independent states. Bulgaria gained autonomy. The Turkish province of Eastern Rumelia was formed. The policy of imperialism of the great powers has been confirmed in practice. Fragile stability in the Balkans has been achieved at the green table and under the supervision of the great powers. The borders were drawn in accordance with the decisions in the diplomatic offices without taking too much care of the situation in the society or the ethnic composition of the population in certain areas. For several decades, Austria and Russia have sought to agree on the division of influence on the Balkan Peninsula south of the Danube, by dividing spheres of interest along the West-East line. Thus, Austria occupied Bosnia and Sandzak (formally still Ottoman provinces), and tied Serbia to itself with a “secret convention” – a kind of dependence agreement. On the other hand, Russia treated Bulgaria and the area of the Turkish Empire up to Constantinople as potential areas of its own influence, i.e. future direct possession. Other great powers, primarily Great Britain and France, treated the Balkans in accordance with their global interests, and especially in context of their relations with Russia (and later with Germany).
Apart from the confrontation of the great powers (the empires), in this period, for the first time, instead of cooperation, there was a frontal confrontation of young Balkan nationalisms (a similar phenomenon had previously occurred in Austria during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848). In 1885, the first, short-lived local war took place between two Balkan nations: Serbia and Bulgaria, which announced future conflicts between local factors over the division of territory, influence and leadership in the Balkans. Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece will seek to expand their influence in the still unliberated territories of European Turkey (primarily in Macedonia). In the coming decades, emerging Balkan “nation-states” will contribute to new conflicts, such as the 1st and 2nd Balkan Wars. All of them will take part – on different sides – in the First World War, which erupted from the spark created in the Balkans.
The Versailles Order – Between Small Nation-States and the Hegemony of the Great Powers (1918-1939)
The Great (First) World War meant the end of the presence of the old empires on the Balkan Peninsula. The Habsburg state (like the German Reich and Russia of the Romanovs) disappeared. Reduced Turkey has, painfully and thanks to Ataturk’s radical reforms, turned into a modern nation-state. A total of six states emerged in the Balkans, which were once occupied by two empires (not counting Hungary) [16]. The Treaty of Versailles, as well as the accompanying peace treaties (Trianon etc.), were to some extent based on the principles of “self-determination of the people” – one of the 14 peace principles of US President W. Wilson [17].
However, few in the Balkans were completely satisfied with the final solutions. The unstable balance between the two groups of states (the “revanchist” versus the status quo) was maintained through established alliances: the Lesser Entente (“anti-Hungarian alliance”: Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia) and the Balkan alliance (“anti-Bulgarian alliance”: Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey) which was supported and supervised by one great European power – France. The “revanchist” states, led by Italy (besides it, there were also Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania), tried to influence the changes in the balance of power. With the rise of German power in the 1930s and later, most Balkan states turned to a new European hegemon – Nazi Germany.
Instead of the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, a new state and an important geopolitical factor appeared in the Balkans – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, the fiction of the “three-named people” did not last long. It turned out that Yugoslavia inherited many problems similar to those that existed in multinational empires. [19] Initially organized as a centralized country, Yugoslavia began its transformation into a complex state in 1939 with the formation of the autonomous Banovina of Croatia. However, this process of peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia into a kind of (con)federation was interrupted by the April war of 1941.
“New European Nazi Order” – the Balkans at the will of the Führer
Although Nazi Germany, i.e. Hitler, did not have a clear plan for the Balkans at the beginning of World War II (the Balkans were primarily a potential space for Hitler to provide raw materials and food for the German Reich) and especially not for Yugoslavia, this plan was somewhat created after the March coup in Belgrade and the April 6 war in 1941 and carried out as follows: instead of the hitherto central Balkan country of Yugoslavia, which was physically destroyed and divided – Germany and Italy supported the creation of satellite states such as “Greater Croatia” (NDH) and “Greater Albania” (under Italian control). [20] Along with them, German satellites Hungary and Bulgaria expanded their borders at the expense of Yugoslav territories as a reward for an alliance with Germany in the attack on Yugoslavia. Germany annexed part of the territory along its border (today’s Slovenia), and Italy did the same (with parts of Slovenia as well as Dalmatia). Reduced Serbia south of the Danube along the part of Banat (“Nedić’s Serbia”) from which Macedonia (belonged to Bulgaria) and Montenegro were separated, was under direct German occupation throughout the war. Montenegro remained under Italian occupation.
As an absolute hegemon and arbiter in fascist Europe, Hitler also arbitrated on disputed border issues between his satellites, so in 1940 he decided to cede Romania to Transylvania to an enlarged Hungary, thus annulling the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. In his geostrategic plans, Hitler paid special attention to the Danube area, as one of the axes of the “new order” in Europe. The circumstances of the war prevented the improvised and temporary Nazi plans to reshape the Balkans from taking root. [21]
Order after World War II – The Balkans during the Cold War
The post-war system throughout Europe until 1992 was characterized by a division into two opposing ideological blocs. [22] The “steel curtain” that divided Europe and in a way froze the division into “West” and “East” of the continent also passed through the Balkan Peninsula. In the Balkans, two countries were members of NATO (Greece and Turkey), the other two belonged to the Eastern Bloc (Bulgaria and Romania), while the socialist countries of Albania and Yugoslavia had been allied with the USSR since the end of the war, but later gained special status between the two blocs (Yugoslavia as a neutral-non-aligned country, and Albania as an ally of China). After World War II, socialist Yugoslavia was transformed into a federation of six republics (along with two provinces that formed part of Serbia), theoretically autonomous mini-states-nations that united voluntarily. [23] The Yugoslav federation was additionally constitutionally transformed in 1963 and 1974 in the direction of a greater (con)federalization. However, the communist way of governing somewhat obscured the very high degree of constitutional decentralization of Yugoslavia, which during the 1980s was in an almost constant economic and then political crisis, which eventually led to its disintegration. [24] The Balkans in the 21st Century – in Search of New Foundations of Stability in the Framework of European Integration and Multilateral Cooperation
The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the SFRY, the war in Yugoslavia, as well as the NATO intervention in 1999 in the FRY, Serbia and Kosmet, raised the question of finding a basis and framework for stabilizing the Balkans in new circumstances. Six internationally recognized states were created on the ruins of the SFRY. [25] For decades, international peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions have been present in parts of the Balkans.
If we look at the entire Balkan area, we could conclude that, objectively, there is no state in the region that in the new conditions would eventually play the role of internal “hegemon” or bearer of stability [27], nor in this context it is possible for one country to play the role of permanent “leader” – that is, leadership within a broader group.
The stabilization process in this still politically sensitive area largely depends on the wider stable situation in Europe, and primarily on the position and actions of the European Union as a kind of modern “hegemon” or, conditionally speaking, “democratic post-modern empire”. [28 ] After the end of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the EU took measures of a military, political and economic nature in order to first stabilize (peacekeeping mission, confidence-building measures, etc.) and then join and integrate this area into the Union. These measures, among others, at a later stage included the so-called Stabilization and Association Process, European Partnership Program, financial support for reconstruction of the region (CARDS and IPA programs), formation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, conclusion of Stabilization and Association Agreements, candidate status and opening of EU membership negotiations with individual countries, etc. Through strengthened multilateralism, i.e. the gradual inclusion of practically the entire Balkan area in Euro-Atlantic integration, support is being built for the construction of legally stronger and more functional “nation-states” [29]. Prior to EU membership, the countries of the region are also involved in the many frameworks of regional multilateral cooperation (regional initiatives and organizations) that provide opportunities to strengthen mutual trust and improve relations [30]. This gradually raises the level of stability of the Balkan region in three steps: stabilization on the ground and strengthening the rule of law, then through regional multilateralism between the countries of the region, and finally by joining the European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration. EU membership enables the Europeanization and transformation of state structures and societies in the candidate countries. In the period 2004-2007, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, among others, while Croatia became a member in 2013. It should also be added that in the period 1999-2009 NATO includes, among others, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Albania (and Montenegro will also be included in 2017). Thus, the participation of the countries of Southeast Europe in deeper integration (in some cases with supranational elements) should in principle ensure more stable relations in the region in the long run.
Towards a regional community in the Balkans?
The EU crisis, deepened by the expected geopolitical changes that are a consequence of the referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU, calls into question the projection of stability in the Balkan region, as we might expect in the situation of a stable Union.
When considering an international system, one can primarily start from the issue of the balance of international power (between states) [31] as a basis for stability. In other words, the question that should be answered is whether the relations of international actors are such that they could potentially provoke conflicts or war, or vice versa, to contribute to peace and cooperation? What circumstances are needed to maintain peace, then to achieve other domestic and international goals and establish certain social values such as the existence of internal stability and democracy, enabling development and cooperation, ensuring social justice, respect for human rights and so on?
In each of the six historical phases mentioned in this text, the relative balance of the Balkan system was temporary and essentially provided by external action, i.e. the influence of great powers. If we analyze the three levels of stability we listed at the beginning of this text (international/European, regional and internal/national) which at each historical stage were reasons to secure or disrupt the existing Balkan system, we can conclude that the causes of the disruptions that led to evolution of the system, i.e. changes in power relations in each of the phases passed were as follows: 1. (Vienna Congress system): internal disturbances (uprisings); 2. (system of the Berlin Congress): internal (uprisings) and international (external intervention of the great powers); 3. (Versailles order): regional (Balkan wars) and international (world war); 4. (Nazi order): international (world war); 5. (Cold War system): internal (collapse of socialist regimes) and international (disintegration of the bloc division in Europe). This analysis shows that the factors of maintaining or disrupting (destabilizing) the previous systems in the Balkans had primarily a general – international cause, and that the second most common were internal reasons in the countries (failure to maintain the internal social and political system). Only in the third place do we state the causes of the destabilization of the system that had a regional character (i.e. conflicts between regional states, such as the Balkan wars). We can therefore conclude that the potential cause or precondition of conflict or (de)stabilization in the Balkans in principle stems from, first, the international (primarily European) situation, then from the internal stability of the Balkan states (such as the process of separatism or social uprisings), and only at the end of the character of regional relations.
As in previous periods, the latest transformation of regional relations in the Balkans in the 21st century, which has the characteristics of the Balkanization process, could be systemically unstable as well as significantly dependent on external influences. Provided that relative internal stability is maintained in each of the Balkan states, long-term balance, i.e. stability in Balkan relations can primarily provide a process of gradual integration into European structures that can be seen as a kind of “supranational or imperial framework” for nation states. The historical role of the European Union, as a “security community” and the main precondition for ensuring long-term peace and stability, i.e. preventing war, should be confirmed in the Balkans as well.
In recent decades, non-European factors, such as Russia and Turkey, which have traditional interests and ties in this area, have become increasingly active in the Balkans. The fact that after expanding to Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, the European Union has practically slowed down and made further enlargement uncertain, leaves in its “Balkan yard” a part of the region whose geopolitical future becomes less certain than it was ten or more years ago. In this sense, the actions of individual EU member states to encourage stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans and the prospect of EU membership through the “Berlin Process” etc. cannot be a complete substitute for a clear prospect of enlargement, as a major factor in stabilizing and Europeanizing the region.
Of course, the stability of the Balkans also depends on the internal social and economic situation and the building of legal systems in each of the countries in the region. Stability also depends on the practice of regional multilateral cooperation between the Balkan countries, which is also one of the elements in the processes of Europeanization of nation states in Southeast Europe.
[3] For the history of the Balkans c. among others: G. Castellan, “Histoire des Balkans XIV-XX siecles”, Fayard, Paris, 1991, 531 p; M. Glenny, “The Balkans 1804-1999”, Granta Books, London, 726 p; M. Mazover, “The Balkans, A Brief History”, Alexandria Press, 2003. 189 p; J. Lampe, “Balkans into Southeastern Europe”, Palgrave, London, 2006, 328. [4] For the general history of 19th and 20th century Europe in: E. Hobsbawm, “The Age of Revolution 1789-1848”, Abacus, London, 2008, 414 p; “The Age of Capital 1848-1875 and The Age of Extremes 1914-1991”, Abacus, London, 2010, 627. N. Davies, “Europe, A History”, Pimlico, London, 1996, 1365 p; J.B. Duroselle, “Europe, A History of its People”, Viking, London, 1990, 422; M. Mazower, “Dark Continent, Europe’s Twentieth Century”, Penguin Books, London, 1998, 495 p. [5] The French dictionary Petit Robert defines the term “Balkanization” as “the political fragmentation of a country or an empire.” The word also has a broader meaning in terms of fragmentation or disintegration in general. [6] “From the French Revolution, it is taken that in the creation of the state, the people’s consciousness is the most important of all factors”, S. Jovanović, “On the state, the basis of a legal theory”, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1990, p. 32. [7] On the relationship between nationalism and democracy, c. among other things, a great study by Istvan Bibo: “The misery of small Eastern European countries “, IK Zoran Stojanović, S. Karlovci, 1996, 119, especially p. 49 where the author says: “National feeling, even when narrow-minded and petty, is a serious mass feeling in the closest sympathy with democracy…”
[8] A. Mitrović, “The Time of the Intolerant”, Europe 1919-1939, SKZ, Belgrade, 1974, p. 73. [9] E. Hobsbawm, “The Age of Extremes 1914-1991”, Abacus, London, 2010, 627. [10] After all, no political system, international or internal, is sustainable in the long run solely through the action of an external factor, i.e. if at the same time there is no adequate internal stability. [11] On regional cooperation in the Balkans c. D. Lopandić, J. Kronja: “Regional Initiatives and Multilateral Cooperation in the Balkans”, EPUS, Belgrade 2010, 316 pages, and literature given in the book. On the broader concept of the influence of regional organizations in the direction of creating the so-called “Security Communities” P. Simić, “Theory of the “Security Community” and the expansion of the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans”, Challenges of European integration, 2011/15, 35-45 [12] The existence of a narrow belt of Venetian territory on the Adriatic, or “Illyrian Principles” as part of the Napoleonic Empire, on the one hand, and the vassal Ottoman provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia did not change much in the general picture of the then bipolar division of the Balkans. [13] On the Congress of Vienna c. A. Zamoysky’s monumental study, “Rites of Peace, The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna”, Harper, London, 2007, 634 p. See also Kissinger’s analysis in H. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, Versailles Press, Belgrade, 1999, p. 59 et seq.
[14] On the development of Serbian statehood c. R. Ljušić, “Serbian statehood of the 19th century”, SKZ, Belgrade, 2008, 497 p. C. also “The History of Serbian Nation”, books 5 i 6, SKZ, Beograd 1981. B. Popović, “The Diplomatic History of Serbia”, ZU, Belgrade, 2010, 611 p. D. Lopandić, “To Serve Your Dear Fatherland, from the History of Serbian Diplomatics 1804-1914”, Sl. Glasnik, Belgrade, 2010, 209 pages. [15] On the Eastern Question c. Ć. Popov, “The Eastern Question and the Serbian Revolution 1804-1918”, SKZ, Belgrade 2008. [16] Given Hungary’s position and actions, it is virtually impossible to exclude this country from the analysis of the Balkan “subsystem” of international relations. [17] On the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles 1919: M. MacMillan, “Peacemakers, Six Months that changed the World”, John Murrey ed., London 2001. See also A. Mitrović, “The Time of the Intolerant, Political History of the Great European States 1919-1939”, Belgrade, 2004. [18] In addition to the already mentioned literature c. also B. Krizman, “Foreign Policy of the Yugoslav State 1918-1941”, School Book, Zagreb, 1975, 199 p. [19] The warning that Serbia, if it expands too much, will find itself in interethnic problems similar to those of Austro-Hungary was already given in the 19th century by Svetozar Markovic, in: “Srpske obmane”, Bigz, Belgrade, 1973. [20] S. Pavlović, “Serbia, History Behind the Name”, Clio, Belgrade 2004, special chapter 7: “Serbia in pieces”, p. 172 id. See also M. Mazower, “Hitler’s Empire, Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe”, Penguine Books, 2009, 726 p. See also A. Trud, “Geopolitics of Serbia”, Sl. Glasnik, Belgrade 2007, 219 pages. On German politics in World War II c. and Hermann Neubacher, “Special Task Balkans”, Sl. Oct., 2004. [21] J. Durand, “Le nouvel ordre europeen nazi 1938-1945”, Complexe, Bruxelles, 1990, 340 p. [22] For this period see especially T. Judt, “Postwar, A History of Europe since 1945”, Penguin Books, London, 2005, 933 p. [23] The 1974 Constitution of the SFRY defines republics as “states based on the sovereignty of the people”, c. M. Jovićić, “Sovereignty of the Federal Units”, Naučna knjiga, Beograd, 1992, 104 p. Some republics were constitutionally-terrorist “national states” of not only one, but several peoples, such as Croatia (where Serbs and Croats were “constituent people” until 1991) or Bosnia and Herzegovina (where all three peoples were “constitutive”).
[24] On the fate of Yugoslavia c. A. Đilas, “Osporavana zemlja”, Književne novine, Belgrade 1990, 291. According to Z. Djindjić, Yugoslavia was an “unfinished state” because it was not possible to “determine with certainty where the deposit of sovereignty is”, c. M. Podunavac, “Strategy of Political Radicalism, Philosophical Testament of Zoran Djindjic”, Politika, April 21, 2012, Kulturni dodatak, p. 5. [25] In Kosovo, independence was unilaterally declared, which was not recognized by either Serbia or most countries in the international community. [26] NATO troops are present in Kosovo, and an EU peacekeeping mission – EUFOR called “Althea” has been operating in BiH since 2004. [27] On certain ambitions of Turkey in this regard c. D. Tanasković, “Neo-Ottomanism, Turkey’s Return to the Balkans”, Sl. Glasnik, Belgrade 2010
[28] On theories related to the explanation of the political phenomenon of the European Union, see, inter alia: p. Andersson, “The New Old World”, Verso, London, 2009, 561 p; J. Weiler, “The Constitution of Europe”, Filip Visnjic, Belgrade, 2002, 401 p; U. Beck, E. Grande, “Cosmopolitan Europe”, IGI, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2006, 355 pages; S. Hicks, “The Political System of the European Union”, Sl. Glasnik, Belgrade, 2007, 472 p; D. Šidjanski, “In Search of a New European Federalism”, Gutenberg’s Galaxy, Belgrade, 2002, p. 118. G. Morgan, “The Idea of a European Superstate”, Princeton, 2005, 212 p; E. Du Reau, “L’Idee d Europe au Xxe ciecle”, Ed. Complexe, Paris 1995, 371. R. Cooper talks about the “new European order” which is the result of the emergence of the EU as a “postmodern empire” or a specific “commonwealth” c. R. Cooper, “La Fracture des nations”, Danoel, Paris, 2003, especially p. 95-104.
[29] On enlargement policy and EU influence, especially on Serbia c. A. Kellermann et al (ed), “The Impact of EU Acession on the Legal orders of New EU Member States”, Asser Institute, The Hague, 2005, 465 p; A. Ott and K. Inglis, “Handbook on European Enlargement”, Asser Press, The Hague, 2002, 1116 p; S. Samardžić (ed.) “Serbia in the process of joining the EU”, Sl. Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009, 289 pages; M. Crnobrnja and A. Trbovic, “Impact Assessment of Serbia’s Accession”, FEFA, Belgrade, 2009, 250; D. Lopandić, “EU Reforms, Western Balkans and Serbia”, ECPD, Belgrade, 92 pages; S. Marković (ed.), “Europe and the Western Balkans after the Great Enlargement”, IES, Belgrade, 2005, 250 p; Lopandić, D. (ed.), “EU and the Balkans: what after Thessaloniki?”, Proceedings, Belgrade, 2004, European Movement in Serbia and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, CD edition. [30] V. E. Busek, B. Kune, “From Stabilization to Integration”, The Stability Pact for SEE, Wien, 2010, 266 p. [31] For theories of war and peace in the context of interstate equilibrium c. R. Aron, “Paix et Guerre entre les Nations”, Calman-Levy, Paris, 1962, 790 p, especially p. 103-183. It should be recalled that S. Jovanović noted that “the state began as a military community” and that “no matter how much its tasks have multiplied and developed over time, the state remains basically a military institution”, On the State, op.cit., P. 36 and 38.